The European Court of Justice and Process-oriented Review
Koen Lenaerts * Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic. 1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a 'representation-reinforcing' mechanism. 2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted.
Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between 'substantive' and 'structural' matters. 3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the 'structure' set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to 'substantive outcomes' has been counterbalanced by a strict 'process review'. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats. 5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.
I. The importance of the prior assessment of the different policy choices available
In Vodafone, four of the leading European mobile operators, Vodafone, Telefónica O2, T-Mobile and Orange (the 'applicants'), challenged the provisions adopted by the UK which implemented Regulation No 717/2007 6 (the 'Roaming Regulation'). 7 That
Regulation lays down maximum charges that mobile operators may levy for voice calls made and received by users outside their own network (this is known as the 'Euro-tariff'). 8 The Roaming Regulation also lays down the maximum price that the consumer's operator must pay to the foreign operator when that consumer uses the latter operator's network (this is known as the 'wholesale roaming charges').
Additionally, mobile operators are obliged to provide information about roaming charges to customers. As to the case at hand, the ECJ noted that prior to the adoption of the Roaming Regulation the level of charges for international roaming services was high.
This was due to the high wholesale charges levied by the foreign operators as well as to the high retail mark-ups charged by the home operator. 16 The relationship between costs and roaming prices, the ECJ observed, was not that of a fully In order to correct that situation, the ECJ held that the EU legislator was entitled to adopt a specific ex ante regulatory measure which would take into account the unique characteristics of the roaming markets and seek to maintain competition among mobile operators, namely the imposition of a price ceiling for the retail and wholesale charges made for roaming services.
As to the principle of proportionality, the question was whether, by laying down a Euro-tariff, the Roaming Regulation breached that principle. To begin with, the ECJ recalled that, when exercising its legislative powers involving political, economic, and social choices of great complexity, the Union enjoys broad discretion.
Only where an EU measure is manifestly inappropriate to the objectives it pursues will the ECJ rule that it is contrary to the principle of proportionality. 20 Yet, the ECJ pointed out that the exercise of such discretion must be based on objective criteria. happen'. The ECJ also stressed that 'only the regulation of retail charges could improve the situation of consumers directly'. 24 Hence, in light of the broad discretion enjoyed by the EU legislator, it was legitimate for the latter to set out a scheme regulating both the wholesale and the retail markets. 25 Moreover, the measure at issue was proportionate in so far as it was limited in time. Article 13 of the Roaming
Regulation contained a 'sunset clause', i.e. that Regulation was to expire on 30 June 2010.
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As to the principle of subsidiarity, the ECJ focused on the imposition of a Euro-tariff. In contrast to the position on the retail market, it was clear that Member
States lacked the regulatory competence in the wholesale market, since a Member
State could not impose a price ceiling on a mobile operator located in another Member State. Accordingly, in relation to the wholesale market, the fact that the Roaming Regulation complied with the principle of subsidiarity was self-evident.
Regarding the Euro-tariff, the ECJ observed that the Roaming Regulation sought to contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market, by allowing operators to act within a single and coherent regulatory framework. To that end, the EU legislator was entitled to adopt harmonising measures which prevented diverging national laws from disrupting that framework. Accordingly, given the interdependence between the wholesale and retail roaming markets, a regulatory framework limited to one of those 23 Ibid., para. 58. 24 Ibid., para. 66. 25 Ibid., para. 68. 26 Ibid., para. 69. However, see Article 13 as amended by Regulation 544/2009, above n 6, which now provides that the Roaming Regulation is to expire on 30 June 2012. Moreover, it is true that, in accordance with paragraph 69 of the judgment, the ECJ appears to introduce a threepronged proportionality test, whereby, in addition to the 'suitability' and 'necessity' tests, the ECJ also balances the objective pursued by the measure in question against the economic burdens imposed on mobile operators. However, see Brenncke, Case Note (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1793, at 1811, who observes that the ECJ did not apply a substantive test of proportionality stricto sensu, but limited itself to ruling that the measures at issue were proportionate in light of the importance of the objective pursued and the limited duration of the intervention.
two markets would have turned out to be insufficient to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market in roaming services. Hence, a joint regulatory intervention in both markets was required and would be best achieved at EU level.
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Vodafone is an interesting example that shows how the ECJ applies the principle of proportionality in a procedural fashion. Instead of second-guessing the merits of the substantive choices made by the EU legislator, the ECJ preferred to make sure that lawmakers had done their work properly: the EU legislator had to show before the ECJ that it had taken into consideration all the relevant interests at stake. In so doing, the ECJ stressed the importance of the preparatory study carried out by the Commission, in which the latter institution showed that it had examined different regulatory options and assessed their economic, social and environmental impact, before deciding to impose a price ceiling in the retail roaming market. 28 In the Commission's own words, the impact assessment is 'the process of systematic analysis of the likely impacts of intervention by public authorities. It is as such an 
IV. Concluding remarks
Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats are three recent judgments which were delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. To some extent, these judgments reveal that, when examining the validity of EU policy measures, the ECJ is not reluctant to follow an approach that focuses on improving the decision-making process of the EU institutions, rather than on second-guessing their substantive findings.
As Vodafone shows, 'process review' is an interesting way of making sure that, in areas where the EU legislator enjoys broad discretion, the latter does not commit abuses. 'Process review' increases judicial scrutiny over the decision-making process of the EU institutions. However, it prevents the ECJ from intruding into the realm of politics. Moreover, by inviting the political institutions of the EU to enhance deference to the expertise and higher institutional capacities of policy makers, it may be the only way of judicially enforcing principles that have a clear political nature, such as the principle of subsidiarity.
Moreover, 'process review' should always precede substantive judicial review in order to allow the ECJ to make use of its 'passive virtues' 64 by avoiding unnecessary substantive conflicts with the EU political institutions. In my view, the ECJ is more respectful of the prerogatives of the political institutions of the EU if it rules that, when adopting the contested act, those institutions failed to take into consideration all the relevant interests at stake, than if it questions their policy choices by reference to its own view of the issues involved. This is precisely what the ECJ did in Volker und Markus Schecke.
Last but not least, Test-Achats stresses the importance of consistency. By looking at the contextual aspects of the principle of proportionality, not only is the ECJ enhancing the legitimacy of the EU legislator when the latter imposes limits on fundamental rights, but also its own judicial legitimacy. It shows that the ECJ is ready to declare invalid an EU provision which, in addition to derogating from a fundamental right, gives rise to contradictions with the EU act of which it forms part.
Unlike the U.S. academic debate over structuralism, the purpose of my contribution was not to prove the operability (or inoperability) of the 'substance vs. process' divide in the context of the EU legal order. Instead, I limited myself to showing the advantages of reviewing the different procedural steps taken by the EU political institutions when adopting an act of general application. In that regard, it seems to me that an increased judicial control of the decision-making process does not imply that judges should take a more pro-active stand whereby the latter replace the substantive choices made by the EU political institutions with their own. Nor should a process-oriented review be equated with judicial surrender. On the contrary, more often than not, courts can contribute to aligning political decisions with the structure set out in the Treaties if they provide incentives to improve the rationality of the decision-making process of policy makers. 
